El Greco, "Christ Driving the Traders from the Temple" - 1600
Vatican Palace, Rome

When we study the history of Christianity, we are quickly impressed by the variety of doctrines that are included under that name. There is no homogeneous philosophy which can simply be labelled as 'Christian ethics' without much qualification. For this reason it is almost impossible to trace the many and often subtle differences among these doctrines. But it seems possible, without too much distortion, to distinguish three main streams of ethical thought which can be distinguished as 'Christian'.

Let us call the first type of Christian ethical thought pastoral Christian ethics. This name refers to the moral views of certain early Christian sects, views which developed out of Judaism and Persian mystical religions. They emphasize the Decalogue (i.e., Ten Commandments), ritualistic practices (e.g., baptism), and the moral teachings of Christ. Christ is considered to be a holy prophet, giving divinely inspired guidance for living ('As ye sow so shall ye reap.'). We call this sort of outlook 'pastoral' because it has little connection with philosophical speculation. The subtle controversies which we find in the later writings of the church Fathers are almost entirely nonexistent in early Christianity. Instead, the emphasis is upon morally correct behaviour. Systematic speculation about the beliefs themselves is lacking compared with later developments.

The second type of Christian ethics is much more analytic than the 'pastoral'. It appears only after the Catholic Church has developed as a social and political, as well a a religious, institution. We may call the ethics of this period 'Church Ethics'. But even Church Ethics has undergone profoundand numerous changes in its long history. These changes are due to a number of factors. For example, the influence of Plato and Aristotle upon the Christian Fathers altered the entire Christian conception of 'other-worldliness', bringing to it a metaphysical character which was lacking in pastoral Christianity. Again, the concept of the soul changes from the time of Origen (who regards it as being the same in all human beings) to the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, who considers every soul to be unique. This has important consequences for the doctrine of immortality.

Other causes of the change in Church Ethics are the following: (a) The rise of religious institutions such as the monastery and nunnery led the Church officially to favour asceticism and this view greatly affected its doctrines regarding sexual morality. (b) The growth of the Church as factor in political and social life caused its ethical doctrine to vary depending upon the state of the continuing conflict between Church and State over the direction of people's lives. (c) Difficulties about the interpretation of Scripture of the sort which finally resulted in withdrawal of Luther from the Church. (The Protestant Reformation also caused some alteration in the official doctrine).

As a result of these infuences, the ethical views of St. Augustine which could be regarded as expressing official church philosophy in the fourth century, were considerably revised by St. Thomas in the thirteenth century, and differ so much in certain respects as to form (almost) a new ethical outlook. A major difference for example was the shift from a moral philosophy based upon Neo-Platonism (in St. Augustine) to a philosophy based upon Aristotle (in St. Thomas).

Finally, the third type of Christian ethics came about with the Reformation and the development of Protestantism. Protestants rejected the ethical views of Catholicism (as represented by St. Thomas) in many respects (whether the clergy could marry, for example), but even within Protestantism no consistent ethical system has prevailed. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that there are nearly as many variations in ethical doctrine among Protestants as there are Protestant sects. In spite of this diversity, however, all these moral doctrines possess certain features in common which serve to distinguish them from other religious codes such as Judaism, Buddhism and Mohammedanism. Because of the existence of these traits we are justified in speaking of 'Christian Ethics' as a single and distinct doctrine.

All such ethical views, as can be called 'Christian' assume the existence of a divine being, and they further assume that this being is in some manner identified with Christ. Because of the latter belief, Christianity can be sharply distinguished from Judaism, for example. Christian sects vary in the powers they ascribe to the divine being, and they also disagree about the exact relation the divine being has to Christ. In some it is the relation of simple identity; in others this is not so (e.g., the confiicts that arose between the Monophysites, the Nestorians and orthodox Christians).

Similar differences exist with respect to an interpretation of the nature of Christ (to what extent Christ is human, to what extent divine). However, even those early Christian sects which denied that Christ was identical with God agreed at least that God made His will known by means of Christ; hence the preachings of Christ about the proper way for men to live are assumed by all Christian moral theories to be the expressions of the divine will. The preachings of Christ, together with certain other ethical prescriptions such as the Decalogue and certain of the writings in the New Testament, are regarded as forming a moral 'code'. A person is considered by all Christian doctrines to be behaving rightly in so far as he behaves in accordance with the code, and immorally in so far as he violates any of its provisions, such as 'Thou Shalt Not Steal'. Christian ethics may thus be summarized as the view that there is a divine being who has laid down certain rules for moral behaviour, and that correct conduct consists in acting in accordance with these rules and incorrect conduct consists in violating them.

In actual practice, however, Christian sects are not in agreement about which rules make up Christian conduct. For example, the practice of birth control is regarded as immoral by Catholics but is not so regarded by most Protestant sects. In order to understand why Christian religions can differ in practice, even though they all agree to the above theoretical picture, we must refer to a distinction between what has been called 'ethical theory', and what has been called casuistry. Roughly speaking, casuistry is applied ethics. Once we decide what is good or bad in general (and this is the function of ethical theory), then we can go further and compile a list of things which are conducive to the production of goodness and things which are conducive to the production of badness. Casuistry is the practice of compiling such lists.

Now the difference between the various Christian moral codes concerning practical conduct can be regarded not so much as a difference in theory as it is a casuistical difference; they all agree that God has ordained a system of rules which must be followed; but they disagree as to which rules belong to the system, and this latter disagreement may be regarded as one of casuistry, not of theory.

Of course not all disagreements between various forms of Christianity should be regarded as differences about which rules belong to the system; quite often, they may agree that a certain rule belongs, but still interpret it differently. This kind of difficulty often arises when one tries to apply teachings of the past to those problems of the present (such as the problem of birth control) that were not envisaged when the original statements of the doctrine were made.

We cannot, of course, here look at all the casuistical differences between the forms of Christianity, but in order to indicate the nature of casuistry, as opposed to ethical theory, we shall examine some of the pronouncements of St. Thomas concerning sexual morality. These pronouncements still form the orthodox outlook of the Catholic Church upon such matters. According to St. Thomas, there are certain general ways in which we should behave - for instance, they should love God & our neighbours. There are also certain specific ways in which we should not behave. For example, the moral code disapproves of adultery. It also forbids sexual relations between husband and wife save for the purpose of procreation - that is why birth control is prohibited. Divorce is not allowed because the father is essential in the education of the children.

Turning from these injunctions to more theoretical matters, the general view of Christian ethics (regardless of sect) is that the good life for us consists in the love of God, and that this good life can be attained by behaving in accordance with God's precepts (by behaving in accordance with the rules ordained by God, as interpreted by the clergy). In speaking of Christian ethics, we have not stressed what is perhaps its most important element from a standpoint of theoretical ethics: its authoritarianism. The church regards the moral code as an objective and infallible guide to correct behaviour, which cannot therefore be questioned. This is because the code is regarded as an expression of God's will. Anyone who deviates from its precepts is by definition behaving immorally.

In practice, Christian sects have divided over how one is to discover God's will. Fundamentalist sects stress the written word, as found in the Bible, as literally revealing God's will. Catholics hold that the Church is the 'vicar' of God, and that God's will is expressed through the edicts of the Church. Protestants who refuse to accept this doctrine maintain that the relation between man and God is a personal one, requiring no intermediary; and that finally in deciding what God wishes, one must consult his own conscience. The theoretical exposition of a 'conscience theory' is to be found most clearly stated in the writings of Bishop Butler.

criticisms

The succcss of Christian ethics can be measured both by its endurance through immense social and political changes over a period of 2,000 years, and by the fact that it has been widely accepted all over the world. In the latter respect, Christianity is strikingly more successful than Judaism, which is similar in its ability to persist through difficult times. But many philosophers have had serious reservations about Christianity, for reasons which we shall consider now.

One difficulty with Christian ethics stems from its assumption that its moral code expresses God's will. A violation of the code is thus equivalent to disobedience towards accepted authority. Immorality in this view is equated with disobedience. Some philosophers have pointed out that this is an acceptable moral position only if it can be shown that God is good. Why obey the prescriptions of a divine being who may be evil ? And why is disobedience in itself bad if we are disobedient towards a malevolent authority ?

At this point, Christian ethics is faced with a dilemma. Either we must prove (instead of assuming) that God is good, or, we must attempt to justify God's precepts on purely ethical grounds, rather than on theological ones. Both tasks offer major difficulties. For example, the existence of evils such as pestilence, plague, cruelty, premature death, disease seem powerful arguments against the unqualified goodness of God; if one adopts the other alternative and attempts to justify Christian ethics on non-theological grounds then we seem to be sacrificing what is distinctive in the theory.

However, there is another argument that is put forward by many people to stress the need for a non-theological justification of Christian ethics. We have seen the importance Aristotle placed on understanding and his insistence that an action is moral only if done from free choice and in full knowledge of the situation. Many people feel that this is a prerequisite of any moral action. This view of the nature of morality precludes actions done out of obedience (even to the will of God!) from being regarded as truly moral (see Kant). To act morally we must do something because it is right and not merely because God says we must.

A non-theological justification of Christian ethics may be necessary. This becomes apparent when we consider the effects of arguments which deny or at least question the existence of God. If God does not exist then it is impossible to justify the moral code as expressing God's will. Philosophers who were atheists or agnostics, such as the utilitarians could not accept this sort of justification. They frequently agreed with many of the particular moral laws of Christianity ('Thou Shalt Not Steal'), but felt they had to be justified ultimately on non-religious grounds.

A third difficulty arises, even within Christianity, over how we can decide what God ordains. If we accept the writings in the Bible as evidence of God's will, then God's will can be shown to be inconsistent. To avoid these inconsistencies some interpretation of the Bible is required but then it is open to a critic to challenge the authority of the interpretation. If we take the Catholic position that the Church knows God's will, we fall into similar difficulties, and if we finally abide by the authority of conscience then when people's consciences differ, we have as many authorities as we have differing intuitions. Who is to decide whose conscience really expresses God's will?

Puzzled by these kinds of questions, some philosophers have felt that it was necessary to think about ethical problems independently of any official doctrine. This led in some cases, to systems which were incompatible with Christianity. One such system is that of Baruch Spinoza.

This concludes the first part of the course. The second part of this course will uploaded at a future date.